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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a pay-video scheme that manages video stream, key stream and payment stream eﬃciently.
In our scheme, the owner segments a video into fragments and encrypts them with independent keys. The keys
are generated with a novel concept called as hash interval, where each hash interval discloses a range of numbers
without disclosing any information on numbers outside of the range. The video fragments are then broadcast
on one or more channels. A buyer can purchase the keys to decrypt any fragments and, within each fragment,
any desired quality level. The accompanying payment protocol is integrated with the key management protocol
seamlessly and hence the computation cost is very low.
Keywords: Hash Interval, Micro-payment stream, Pay-video
1. INTRODUCTION
Media streaming is becoming more and more popular due to the explosive growth of Internet and multimedia
processing technologies and applications.1 To become a lucrative business of content delivery, a ﬂexible access
control strategy integrated with ﬂexible payment scheme is in desire. Speciﬁcally, the access control approach
must enable the buyer has more than one selection, e.g., time and quality, and hence forms diﬀerent service groups.
For example, Ma et al.2 propose a dynamic access control scheme for group communications which support
multiple service groups with diﬀerent access privileges. The groups may be either independent or dependent.
Their method allows dynamic formation of service groups and maintains forward/backward security when buyers
switch service groups. On the other hand, a ﬂexible payment mechanism accommodates diﬀerent usage and
charging models. Particularly useful are micro-payment schemes that oﬀer the ability to make payments of small
amounts. Although several micropayment schemes3–9 have been proposed, few are designed to support selective
payments of video fragments. The challenge here is how to integrate the key management and payment scheme
such that the buyer pays for what she is interested in.
One straightforward method is to divide the video into fragments and each fragment is protected with an
independent key. The protected fragments are broadcast via CDN (content distribution Network) publicly, but
the decryption keys will be disseminated secretly. If the buyer requests for some fragments, the seller sends the
corresponding decryption keys to the buyer. Clearly, this na¨ıve solution is ﬂexible but ineﬃcient.
Wu et al.10 presented a ﬂexible access method for secure multicast streaming. In the scheme, an owner
segments a video into fragments, and prepares the protected video by selectively encrypting the video fragments
oﬀ line. Proxies store the protected videos and distribute them. To decrypt a protected video or fragment, a
buyer sends to the seller a request for the decryption keys. The seller then generates an enabling block which
enables the buyer to access video or fragments in a period. Therefore, the scheme enables the buyer to access
a fragment or video for a restricted number of dissemination times, but the seller selectively encrypts the video
only once, and seller performs no encryption at all. However, its capability of collusion resilience is low.
Perkins et al.11 proposed a scheme which enabled to access the content for predeﬁned times. In the scheme,
a trust player should be installed such that the number of licenses can be decreased gradually. To defeat against
license backup, an on-line license authority or registrar should be deployed. The scheme also suﬀers from both
additional computational cost and storage.
To overcome the above challenge, we partition a video into fragments based on the video’s utilization charac-
teristics,12, 13 and protect each fragment with a unique key. The keys are produced with our novel hash interval
Send correspondence to Yongdong Wu: wydong@i2r.a-star.edu.sg, www.i2r.a-star.edu.sg/icsd/staﬀ/yongdong/
1 
as realized through two embodiments: two-way chain and down-tree. This hash interval scheme enables a buyer
to generate the fragment keys from the seller’s authorization so as to reduce the network overhead. After the
protected video is produced, it is transmitted in a broadcast channel. If the video is encoded into several layers,
the video layers are distributed with diﬀerent channels. When a buyer wishes to purchase a range of fragments,
she pays for and obtains the keys speciﬁcally for those fragments. At the same time, the buyer cannot render
any other fragment because she has no ways to generate their keys.
Section 2 introduces our proposed hash interval scheme and its embodiments, and Section 3 describes the
possible business model. Section 4 addresses the pay-video scheme. Section 5 depicts the performance of the
proposed scheme in terms of security and cost. Section 6 draws a conclusion.
2. HASH CHAIN AND HASH INTERVAL
In this section, we introduce some primitives which will be employed in the present scheme.
2.1. Hash Function
A hash function takes a variable-length input string and converts it to a ﬁxed-length output string, called a
hash value. A one-way hash function, denoted as h(.), is a hash function that works in one direction: it is easy
to compute a hash value h(m) from a pre-image m; however, it is hard to ﬁnd a pre-image that hashes to a
particular hash value. There are many existing one-way hash functions, such as SHA-1.14
2.2. Hash Chain
Hash chain15 is widely used in many micro-payment schemes (e.g. PayWord3) due to its low computation cost.
In the hash chain shown in Fig. 1, a seed K is used to create a sequence of numbers. A number ki can be
generated from any number kj(i < j) further down the chain, without disclosing any information on numbers
beyond kj . Formally, given a master seed K, the hash chain of length n is constructed as follow,
kN = K
ki = h(ki+1) = hN−i(K), i = N − 1, · · · , 2, 1
where k1 is a public number.
……  k1kN kN- 1 ki
Figure 1. Hash Chain generated from a secret K.
2.3. Hash Interval
Since any number ki in a hash chain can be generated from kj(j > i), the hash chain is not applicable for
range access. For example, a hash chain cannot be used to merely expose the values Γ = {ki, ki+1, . . . , kj} for
some ﬁxed i and j. Instead, we propose the hash interval HI(·) which is used to disclose a range of numbers
without disclosing any information on other numbers below or above the stipulated range. Here we propose two
embodiments to realize the hash interval: two-way chain and down-tree.
2.3.1. Two-Way Chain
As an extension of the hash chain, we set up two hash chains in opposite directions. Given the seeds Kl and Kr,
the hash interval of length N is constructed as
LN = Kl
Li = h(Li+1) = hN−i(LN ), i = N − 1, · · · , 2, 1
R1 = Kr
Ri = h(Ri−1) = hi−1(R1), i = 2, · · · , N
ki = h(Li ‖ Ri) (1)
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……  L1LN LN- 1 Li
……  R1RN RN- 1 Ri
……  k1kN kN - 1 ki
Figure 2. Hash Interval constructed with Two-way chains.
where “‖” is the concatenation operator. Fig.2 illustrates the construction process.
Claim 1: With two-way chain, two numbers Lj and Ri are able to disclose the range Γ = {ki, ki+1, . . . , kj},
and no number kt ∈ Γ is disclosed if no collusion exists.
Proof: It is easy to know that any range can be deduced from its two end numbers based on the above construction
method. Now we prove the second property: no extra number is disclosed.
Assume there is at least one extra number kt ∈ Γ is disclosed, i.e., t < i or t > j. Let’s consider t < i ﬁrst,
kt = h(Lt ‖ Rt). Since h(·) is a one-way function, Lt and Rt are known to the attacker if kt is known to the
attacker. That is to say, the attacker is assumed to obtain Rt from Ri according to Ri = hi−t(Rt). Therefore,
the attacker can subvert the one-way function h(·). Thus, the attacker can not obtain any extra number kt where
t < i. Similarly, the attacker can not obtain any extra number kt where t > j. Claim 1 holds.
2.3.2. Hash Interval Tree
The two-way chain is eﬃcient for exposing a range since only two terminal numbers need to be disclosed.
Unfortunately, it is vulnerable to collusion attack. Speciﬁcally, in some cases, if two ranges Γ1 and Γ2 are
exposed, ∃k, k ∈ Γ1 ∪ Γ2, but k which is a leaf of HI-tree is leaked. To avoid this weakness, we propose a
second embodiment which is a hash tree constructed in a top-down manner. In this Subsection, we seek to
adapt Sandhu’s approach16 to arrive at a Hash Interval tree (HI-tree). The tree root is assumed to be known in
advance, and the value of any non-root node is derived from its parent node. That is to say, given any non-leaf
node with value v of an q-ary tree, the value of its child node i is hi = h(v ‖ i), (i = 1, 2, . . . , q) assuming there
are q child nodes. All the value of leaf node constitutes a universal set {ki}. Fig.3 illustrates the construction
process.
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Figure 3. Hash Interval Tree (q = 2).
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To release an interval of numbers, an enabling block ∗ is issued. For example, if a buyer requires the numbers
Γ = {k2, k3, . . . , k6} in Fig.3, the enabling block S = {k2, hB , hC} is calculated with the method shown in Table
1. In Table 1, the element x ∈ X is the node position in the HI-tree, sibling(x) is the sibling node of node x and
parent(x) is the parent node of node x. The enabling block will be sent to the buyer as well as their positions
in the HI-tree.
Table 1. Generating enabling block given q = 2
input: X = {a, a + 1, . . . , b}
output:enabling block S
S = nil
Enblk(X)
end
function Enblk(X)
U = nil
∀x ∈ X
if sibling(x) ∈ X then S ← S ∪ {x}
else U ← U ∪ {parent(x)}
X ← X− {sibling(x)}
endif
X ← X− {x}
if U = nil then Enblk(U)
endif
Claim 2: In an HI-tree, the enabling block merely discloses the speciﬁc range Γ = {ki, ki+1, . . . , kj}, but no
number kt ∈ Γ is leaked.
Proof: It is easy to prove the correctness of claim 2 when there is no collusion attack. Now let’s focus on
collusion attack. That is to say, an attacker obtains a ﬁnite number of enabling blocks Bi. Denote the union
B =
⋃
Bi. Expanding all the non-leaf nodes in the enabling blocks to their leaf nodes as a set Y. It is a one-to-
one mapping between B and Y. Since all the leaves are independent, the attacker can not obtain any new leaf
x with Y. Therefore, no kt ∈ Γ is disclosed.
3. A VIDEO BUSINESS MODEL
It is possible that a buyer may be interested in some period of the video, not only the start fragments, for
example, the goal period of a football competition. To provide access to selected video fragments, the hash
interval is a suitable tool for secure video delivery.
In the proposed scheme, the system includes the buyer, seller, owner and bank. Fig.4. The owner prepares
the protected content, and the buyer will send the request and payment to seller, and render the authorized
content. The bank will deal with the payment issue.
Owner  Seller 
Buyer 
Bank  
Figure 4. System Structure.
∗Enabling block: Given a sequence of leaves, an enabling block consists of the minimal number of nodes of the HI-tree
and those nodes cover the given leaves exactly.
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In the video business, the content stream is protected with an encryption function and sent publicly, but
the channel for key delivery is assumed to be secure. To obtain the content sent in a secure delivery channel, a
non-authorized buyer may
• obtain the non-authorized content independently or in a collusion way, e.g., the buyer obtains a fragment
of higher quality from several fragments of lower quality, or deduce a decryption key for a non-authorized
fragment from several keys.
• pay less than what she should. In the payment stage, the buyer may send small number of coins to the
seller, e.g., a coin is used twice.
4. PAY-VIDEO PROTOCOL
In the present video distribution application, there are four modules: protected video preparation, Enabling
block generation, payment and rendering.
4.1. Video fragment
To enable buyers to purchase selected portions within a video stream, the video should be segmented into
fragments that are encrypted with diﬀerent keys. In general, a video can be segmented into fragments at
random start and end numbers. However, it is more eﬀective to base the segmentation on the video’s utilization
characteristics.12, 13 As found in experiments by Acharya and Smith,12 only 55% of all requestors play the
entire video, with most stoppages occurring during the ﬁrst 5% of the movie playback period (see Figure 5).
The short starting pattern suggests to distribute the ﬁrst several minutes frequently. Thus, a video should be
segmented based on the usage percentage so as to provide a multiple of services.
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Figure 5. Partial Playback12 – only 55% of all requestors play the entire video, and most stoppages occur during the
ﬁrst 5% of the movie playback period.
4.2. Protected fragment
To generate a protected video stream with an eﬃcient key management, the owner creates an HI-tree with the
method in Section 2, and encrypts the video fragments with the keys (leaves) in the HI-tree.
Furthermore, if a fragment is encoded with n layers (for example, an MPEG-4 stream comprises a basic layer
and several enhancement layers), each layer is encrypted independently and distributed on a separate channel.
In this case, the key structure includes a key chain and an HI-tree as shown in Fig.6 or Fig.7. Despite either
method is applicable to access control for the fragments, their performance depend on the statistics of buyers’
requests. For example, the method in Fig.6 is suitable for a speciﬁc time period, while the method in Fig.7 is
more eﬃcient to the applications when buyers pays for all the fragments at a speciﬁc quality layer.
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Figure 6. Key structure given time access is of higher priority than quality access. An HI-tree is used to generate the
key for a certain requirement(e.g. time) and a hash chain is used to generate key for quality.
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Figure 7. Key structure which is eﬃcient for quality request, where Kn is used for highest quality and K1 is used for
lowest quality.
For simplicity, we merely discuss the key structure in Fig.7 hereinafter. At the owner side, each layer l ≤ n
is segmented into N fragments denoted as Sl1, Sl2, . . . , SlN . Then, the owner generates the layer keys with the
hash chain with a master key K, denote the lth layer key Kl = hn−l(K). For each layer, the owner generates
the fragment key {kli, i = 1, 2, . . . , N} with an HI-tree whose root is Kl. According to an encryption algorithm
enc(·) such as AES, the owner creates the protected fragments as the ciphertext enc(kli, Sli), i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
l = 1, 2, . . . , n. The protected fragments are stored into the seller for delivery.
4.3. Enabling block
After receiving the request and payment from the buyer, the seller checks the validation of the payment, the
seller searches the corresponding quality tree(s) with the method shown in Table 1. For example, if the buyer
requests the quality l0 and fragments between Sli and Slj , i < j. The seller looks up all the quality trees for each
quality l ≤ l0, and all the leaves (or keys) for the fragments Sli and Slj , i < j and constructs the enabling block
Bl. Then, the seller sends
⋃l0
l=1 Bl to the buyer.
4.4. Rendering
Generally, if the buyer requires l layers, she will receive l enabling blocks, and then generate all the fragment
keys {kli}. With the keys kli for fragment i in a speciﬁc layer l, the protected video fragment will be decrypted
correctly and further decoded with the target player.
4.5. Payment sub-protocol
In order to render selected video fragments, the buyer has to pay the seller based on the desired fragments and
quality layers. An electronic payment protocol includes three sub-protocols: signing check, depositing check, and
clearing check.
6
4.5.1. Signing Check
A buyer pays a seller for a transaction by digitally signing a piece of data that identiﬁes the transaction. Initially,
the buyer collects the message D: buyer name, seller name, the time, account and credit information. She also
prepares a hash chain C = {c0, c1, . . . , cN}, where ci = h(ci+1) represents a basic unit of payment, say 1 cent,
and N is the upper boundary of her credit. The buyer sends the message M0 = {D, c0}, her signature on M0,
and her credit certiﬁcate issued by the bank to the seller.
Subsequently, in the ith transaction Ti, if the buyer is interested in a range of video fragments {si, . . . , ei} ⊆
{1, . . . , N}, she sends to the seller the payment as
Mi = {si, ei, cmi−1+pi} (2)
where pi is payment in the transaction Ti, and mi−1 represents the total payment in the last transactions
T1, . . . , Ti−1.
4.5.2. Depositing check
The seller ﬁrst veriﬁes the certiﬁcate and the message M0. If they are authentic, he veriﬁes the authenticity
of payment Mi based on the last transaction message Mi−1. If the veriﬁcation result is also positive, the seller
transmits to the buyer the corresponding enabling blocks constructed with the mechanism in Subsection 2.3.
4.5.3. Clearing check
After receiving the payment messages Mi, the bank will deduct the amount pi from the buyer’s account and
credit the corresponding amount to the seller’s account. Optionally, the seller may forward the payment messages
to the bank in batches.
5. PERFORMANCE
5.1. Cost
In the present scheme, the owner will generate an HI-tree for each quality layer oﬀ line. Assume that there are
n quality levels and N leaves in each HI-tree. The owner will calculate 2N × n + n − 1 hash values in total.
In addition, the owner will encrypt the fragments with N × n encryption operations. At the seller side, the
seller will generate the enabling block to each request as well as check veriﬁcation. The computation cost for
veriﬁcation is almost constant. But the cost of generating enabling block varies with the request. Roughly, it is
much less than the number of requested fragments. Similarly, the buyer will reconstruct the access keys for all
the requested fragments and the computational cost is the same as the seller. Since the computational resource
is mainly used for hash operations, the computation cost is very small. For example, based on experiment result
by Wei,17 the hash computation speed is up to 68MB/s for SHA-1 with a Pentium 4 processor.
The network overhead consists of payment messages and enabling blocks. The payment overhead is constant
for each transaction, while the communication overhead is O(n × log2 ∆i) where ∆i is the requested fragments
in the transaction Ti.
5.2. Security
5.2.1. Access violation
Our proposed scheme oﬀers backward security and forward security due to the safeguards of the hash interval
in Subsection 2.3. That is to say, a buyer who joins at time ti cannot obtain the keys for any time t < ti.
Thus, the buyer cannot decrypt the “old” fragments even if she has recorded the network traﬃc. Furthermore,
if the buyer’s payment entitles her to only up to time tj of the video, she would not be able to render any video
fragments from t > tj .
5.2.2. Payment violation
Our scheme adopts the payment scheme PayWord3 for providing payment stream which corresponds to the
fragment stream. With PayWord, a buyer can pay exactly what she purchases and she is not able to double
payment. Meanwhile, the seller can not charge the buyer more than what the buyer should pay.
7
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a pay-video scheme that manages video stream, key stream and payment stream eﬃciently.
Our scheme proposes a new primitive called hash interval which is an extension of hash chain. To generate the
protected video fragments, the owner fragments a video into fragments and encrypts them with independent keys.
The keys are generated from hash interval. The video fragments are then broadcast on one or more channels. A
buyer purchases the keys to decrypt any consecutive fragments and, any desired quality level. With the payment
stream idea from PayWord, the accompanying payment protocol is integrated with the key management protocol
seamlessly and hence the computation cost is very low.
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